Expounding a bit more on colorblindness
So as I was starting to insinuate in my last post, there were two discrete types of colorblindness peddled by the pc-liberals of the ’90s; one that is quite reasonable and another that’s outright ludicrous in its conception. Let me go into this in further depth, hopefully in a way that brings some coherence and unity to this racket I’ve been making about race perception.
Racial bias originates at the stage of otherization. There need not be any negative evaluation for it to exist.
But take note that there’s a clear distinction between noticing someone’s race and otherizing the person.
Let me explain. There has to be identification for there to be otherization. After all, “other” is a relational word. The “other” only exists in relation to the self.
It’s like this: you may be presented with a new person. And you may notice their race; you may identify them as “black”. But nothing happens unless you then reference the “relational self”.
Which goes like this: you may be presented with a new person. The brain concludes, “she is black.” Then asks, “well, what am I?” Henceforth, the relational self is activated. And the stage is set for cognitive processing along ingroup/outgroup lines. Let’s say you’re white. So, she is an “other”.
Strength of ingroup-identification is a primary determinant of whether the relational self is activated. And, the level of homogeny in a group is what determines the strength of ingroup-identification among its members. In homogenous groups, group identification is strong: so, if you belong to a homogenously white community, you identify strongly as “white”. You may not carry a card, but the fact remains that you are acutely aware of being white.
If your identification with your ingroup is weak, your judgment of the person stops at the level of perception (Jane is black). It does not then ask “well, what am I?” It frankly doesn’t care. Okay, so Jane is black, duly noted; moving on.
What then happens is this.
If you are, however, strongly identified with your racial ingroup, you remain acutely aware of your identity in your everyday life and your assessment of Jane — so your focus shifts quickly from Jane is black to Jane is different. (Different than whom? Different than you, of course. “Different” is a relational word.)
Which is more in line with this.
Noticing someone’s race is immediate, but noticing whether they are different than you takes an additional cognitive jump. Not usually a grand one, but then again the distance leaped depends on how strongly-inclined you are to identify with your ingroup. Furthermore, noticing someone’s race is necessary, but noticing whether they are different than you is not.
So back to that ridiculous movie I was talking about, to which all this is pertinent. (The 1997 re-make of Cinderella, with Brandy.) Casting a white king and a black queen sends the message, “you aren’t supposed to care about race.” Casting an Asian guy as the son of a white king and a black queen sends the message, “you aren’t even supposed to notice race.” Which is really quite ludicrous (literally impossible), considering that race is the second thing people notice about each other, right after gender. (Cognitive-psychological research here, people. Can provide journal citations upon request.)
